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Developments that sparked the most consequential 
constitutional controversies in American history have 
enriched the nation with a second and third Bill o f Rights
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Milton R. Konvitz
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN IDEALS
Three Bills of Rights
H E  S U B J E C T  OF C I V I L  H I S T O R Y ,  W R O T E  E M E R S O N ,  IS
the quarrel between the two parties that divide the state, 
the party of conservatism and the party of innovation.1 
This is clearly the case of American constitutional his­
tory; and what makes that history interesting, important, 
and at times even exciting and alarming is that the inno­
vative events have occurred often and with decisive effect. “ The law,” 
Roscoe Pound wrote, “must be stable, but it must not stand still.”2 At 
no time in American history has constitutional law been so unstable— 
so innovative—so creative as in the last half of the twentieth century.
But often the impression is created, especially when a vacancy oc­
curs in the Supreme Court and a new justice is to be appointed, that 
there is hardly any stability at all in constitutional law, that, as 
Heraclitus taught, “All is flux, nothing stands still. Nothing endures 
but change.”3 This is, I submit, a false impression, or at least an exag­
geration. Some very significant new developments have taken place; 
some new constitutional doctrines and principles have, indeed, 
evolved; and although they have been and may continue to be chal­
lenged, they have, I submit, become a part of the Constitution.
Let me enumerate several of what I consider to be the most impor­
tant new doctrines or principles that are here to stay, that are not likely 
to be upset, regardless of the composition of the Supreme Court:
1. that any invidious discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or reli­
gion is unconstitutional;
2. that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to the states 
just as they apply to the federal government;
3. that there is a right of privacy;
4. that the Constitution guarantees the principle of one person, 
one vote; that the courts have the power to review legislative 
apportionment;
5. that apparent infractions of fundamental rights are subject to strict 
scrutiny;
6. that economic and social legislation is constitutional if reasonable; 
that with respect to such legislation, the Court is not to act as a 
superlegislature; that the wisdom of such laws is not the business of 
the Court;
7. that symbolic acts are protected by the guarantee of freedom of 
speech;
8. that the guarantee of freedom of speech and press protects literary 
and artistic work against prior censorship;
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9. that police must advise criminal suspects prior to interrogation 
that they have certain constitutional rights;
10. that although hard-core pornography is not constitutionally pro­
tected, a publication is not obscene because it contains four-letter 
words, for a work must be viewed and judged as a whole, and con­
sideration must be given to its literary, artistic, or other values;
.11. that the First Amendment mandates separation of church 
and state;
12. that public officials and public figures may not recover damages in 
libel suits unless they can prove actual malice, that the statement 
was made with knowledge of its falsity, or that it was made with 
reckless disregard of whether it was true or false;
13. that there are fundamental rights that are constitutionally pro­
tected although they are not enumerated in the first eight 
amendments;
14. that constitutional guarantees apply to students, prisoners, illegiti­
mate children, and other disadvantaged classes of persons;
15. that right to a passport and right to travel are constitutionally 
protected.
Although some of the above propositions are stated in broad terms, 
no constitutional right is “absolute.” Only Justice Hugo L. Black believed 
that there are absolutes in the Bill of Rights.4 A competing or superior 
public interest may lead the Court to qualify a right, or justices may dis­
agree as to whether the asserted right embraces the facts in the case.5
When Justice Thurgood Marshall died in January 1993, some obitu­
aries and editorials stated that the decision of the Supreme Court in the 
Brown case,6 outlawing racial segregation in public schools, that had
been argued by Marshall as counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, was the most important decision of the century. The 
opinion for the Court in Brown was written by Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, who years later expressed the opinion that in his judgment it 
was not Brown but the Court decision in the 1962 reapportionment case 
of Baker v. Carr7 that was the most important during his years of ser­
vice on the Court, 1953-1969.
From this example alone it is evident that the order of ranking of 
decisions of the Court in importance is a matter of personal judg­
ment. My own opinion is that the most significant development in 
constitutional law has been the selective incorporation of most of the 
first eight amendments of the Constitution into the Fourteenth 
Amendment to make them effective against the states as they are 
against the federal government. This has meant the virtual national­
ization of the Bill of Rights, a result that may well be called a second 
Bill o f Rights.8 Moreover, the Court has recognized certain rights and 
liberties, not at all mentioned in the first eight amendments, that are 
so fundamental that they must be given a constitutional status as 
guarantees as if they had been enumerated in the Bill of Rights. This 
development may well be considered a third Bill of Rights. It is these 
two developments that I shall discuss. I shall also discuss the theories 
and jurisprudential philosophies that are the underpinnings of these 
developments and that have generated the most significant constitu­
tional debate in American history.
Beginning the Process of Selective Incorporation
In 1833, the Supreme Court unanimously held, in an opinion by Chief 
Justice John Marshall, that the Bill of Rights applies only to the federal 
government.9 Thus, although the federal government is prohibited 
from taking private property for public use “without just compensa­
tion,” a state is not under the restriction of the Fifth Amendment, 
though it may be under a similar restriction by a provision of the state’s 
constitution. Some years following the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Justice John Marshall Harlan (1877-1911) contended that
the Due Process clause took into itself the Bill of Rights and made it 
applicable to the states.10 But his was a lonely voice.
In 1925, however, fifty-seven years after the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the process of “incorporation” was 
started. Benjamin Gitlowhad been convicted under a criminal 
anarchy statute of New York for having advocated and taught the 
duty to overthrow the government by force. Although the Supreme 
Court did not save Gitlow from a jail sentence, the majority opinion 
by Justice Edward T. Sanford contained the following path-breaking 
statement:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and 
of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridg­
ment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and “lib­
erties” protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
from impairment by the States.1 1
We should note at least two significant aspects of this statement: first, 
that Justice Sanford did not say that the entire Bill of Rights (or even 
that the entire First Amendment) was applicable to the states, but that 
(only) the guarantee of free speech and free press was protected by 
the Due Process clause; and second, that the basis of this proposition 
is the judgment that free speech and free press are “fundamental per­
sonal rights and‘liberties.’ ” These two elements have continued to 
pervade the decisions and opinions of the Court. They may be re­
stated as follows: Incorporation or absorption of the guarantees of 
the Bill of Rights has proceeded on a piecemeal, case-by-case basis. 
The Bill of Rights in its totality has not been incorporated into the 
Due Process clause, but only selectively. Furthermore, only such pro­
visions of the Bill of Rights have been absorbed as were deemed to 
be “fundamental rights and ‘liberties.’ ”
I think that technically it may be said that, in fact, no provision of 
the Bill of Rights has been carried over to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but that the Court has interpreted the Due Process clause to hold that 
fundamental rights and liberties are protected against infringement by 
the states as a denial of due process of law, or perhaps as a denial of the
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“liberty” guaranteed by the Due Process clause.12 Justices of the Court 
have varied in their rationale, as we shall have occasion to see; but for 
the present, in the interest of simplicity, I shall continue to discuss the 
process as selective incorporation.
In several cases13 in the 1930s the Supreme Court confirmed the 
guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press against in­
fringement by the states. In 1931, in a freedom of the press case, it was 
possible for Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes to declare for the 
Court,
It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech is 
safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
from invasion by state action. It was found impossible to conclude that 
this essential personal liberty of the citizen was left unprotected by the 
general guarantee of fundamental rights of person and property.14
Note may be taken of the fact that there is no reference to the First 
Amendment, but only an explication of the essential meaning of the 
term “liberty” that appears in the Due Process clause.
The next significant development came in the following year, 1932, 
when the Court, in the famous (or notorious) Scottsboro cases held 
that the failure of a state trial court in a capital criminal case to provide 
an effective appointment of counsel for the defendants was a denial of 
due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.15 The Court noted that such right is provided expressly 
by the Sixth Amendment effective in federal courts; the Supreme Court, 
however, did not simply carry over this guarantee as if it were com­
pelled mechanically to incorporate the Sixth Amendment into the 
Fourteenth. What the Court reasoned was that the right to counsel in 
capital criminal cases, in whatever jurisdiction, federal or state, “is of 
such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those ‘fun­
damental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our 
civil and political institutions.’ ”
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Two years later, in 1934, in Hamilton v. Regents,16 the Court consid­
ered whether the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
could be construed to guarantee an individual’s free exercise of 
religion. The University of California, a state institution, required stu­
dents to take courses in military training. Students who were conscien­
tious objectors to war and to training for war claimed that the 
university’s requirement infringed on their religious liberty, and that 
this liberty was part of the “liberty” protected by the Due Process 
clause. Although deciding the case against the claims of the students, 
the Court nonetheless said, “Undoubtedly it [the term ‘liberty’ in the 
Due Process clause] does include the right to entertain the beliefs, to 
adhere to the principles and to teach the doctrines on which these stu­
dents base their objections to the order prescribing military training.”
The majority opinion made no mention of the Free Exercise provi­
sion in the First Amendment, but clearly by implication the Court 
“ incorporated” that guarantee into the Fourteenth Amendment and 
made it applicable to the states. In a concurring opinion (in which 
Justices Louis D. Brandeis and Harlan F. Stone joined), Justice 
Benjamin N. Cardozo stated: “ I assume for present purposes that the 
religious liberty protected by the First Amendment against invasion 
by the nation is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against in­
vasion by the states.”
In 1940, in an opinion by Justice Owen J. Roberts for a unanimous 
Court, the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment was expressly 
and sweepingly incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
was in one of a series of cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses.17 The 
Court said: “ The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that 
[Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the 
First Amendment.” Just as the federal government may not infringe on 
the free exercise of religion, so, too, “ The Fourteenth Amendment has
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to 
enact such laws.”
The broad language quoted above was, however, too sweeping, for 
the case involved only the Free Exercise provision of the First 
Amendment. The case did not involve the Establishment clause, but 
with respect to the latter Justice Roberts’s language foreshadowed 
what was to come seven years later in the very important New Jersey 
bus case.18 In Everson v. Board of Education, decided in 1947, in an 
opinion by Justice Hugo Black, the Court unanimously stressed the 
impact of the First Amendment’s Establishment clause on the states.
If the state law is invalid, said Justice Black, “ it is because it violates the 
First Amendment’s prohibition against the establishment of religion 
by law.. . .  The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, commands that a state ‘shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion....’ ” Although the Court by a 
vote of 5-4 held that the bus fares reimbursed to the students attend­
ing a Catholic school were not an “establishment” of religion by the 
school board, all justices agreed that the First Amendment, incorpo­
rated into the Fourteenth, is decisive and applies to the states just as it 
applies to the federal government. Very little is said in the opinions in 
the case about the Fourteenth Amendment; the concentration was on 
the First Amendment, its historical background, and the philosophy 
on which it was based. The opinions elaborated on the “original in­
tent” of the founders who were responsible for the First Amendment, 
but said nothing about the “original intent” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. This approach of the Court in Everson became problem­
atic for some later justices of the Court, and bit its way into ideological 
conflicts, but I must defer discussion of these matters and continue 
with discussion of the process of selective absorption of the Bill of 
Rights into the Due Process clause.
By mid-century, as we have seen, it had been settled that all of the 
provisions of the First Amendment and the provision of the Sixth 
Amendment relating to counsel in capital cases had been incorporated 
into the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Why Everson Is a Landmark Decision
The flowering of individual rights and liberties was, indeed, an ex­
tremely slow process. The developments I have thus far discussed took 
a span of eighty years, 1868-1947. Why was the pace so slow? It is a 
complicated question; I can venture only a few reasons. The American 
Civil Liberties Union was not founded until 1920, and in its first 
decade it concentrated on conscientious objector and free speech cases 
arising from the suppression of civil liberties during World War I. The 
organization, under the leadership of Roger Baldwin, did much to 
arouse a sensitivity to civil liberties issues. At about the time that the 
ACLU was founded, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. began, mainly in 
dissenting opinions, to alert the Court to the significance of individual 
fundamental rights and liberties, and in this endeavor he was joined by 
Justice Brandeis, who took his seat on the Court in 1916. One might say 
that Holmes and Brandeis picked up where Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison had left off; and then, after Holmes and Brandeis, ad­
vocacy and defense of fundamental rights became the agenda of 
Justices Black, William O. Douglas, Frank Murphy, Wiley B. Rutledge, 
William J. Brennan Jr., Earl Warren, Thurgood Marshall, and others.
To struggle for the vindication of rights and liberties of African- 
Americans, who were certainly meant to be the chief beneficiaries of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was founded in 1909, and 
its program was greatly enhanced by the formation in 1939 of the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. These persons and orga­
nizations awakened the conscience of the nation to recognize the im­
portance of civil liberties and civil rights, and moved the Court from 
being the ultimate bulwark of private property and enterprise to be­
coming the court of last resort for the vindication of an individuals 
fundamental rights.
As I have stated, the most important developments came in the sec­
ond half of the twentieth century, following the decision, in 1947, of the 
New Jersey bus case (Everson v. Board of Education). Although that case 
involved only the Establishment clause of the First Amendment, Justice
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Blacks opinion for the Court, and the concurring opinions by Justice 
Robert H. Jackson and by Justice Rutledge, dramatically concentrated 
the forces of history, logic, public policy, and rhetorical strength on one 
central proposition, that is, that the First Amendment nationalized the 
rights and liberties that are enumerated therein. This has made Everson 
a landmark decision. Its importance transcended the facts of the case. 
and is to be found in its seminal quality. For the question quite natu­
rally was implied: Why cannot the same reasoning, mutatis mutandis, 
be applied to the other articles of the Bill of Rights? Why limit the ratio­
nale of the case to only the First Amendment? From this time on the 
Court laid itself open to receiving and adjudicating litigation involving 
almost the full range of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
The Due Process Revolution
The Everson decision, like the previous First Amendment cases, involved 
what has been called substantive due process; that is, the decisions were 
based not on procedural wrongs but on the infringement of substantive 
rights and liberties, like free speech, free press, free exercise of religion. 
In 1948, however, the Court considered a case involving the claim of a 
denial of procedural due process; namely, that the defendant had been 
denied the right to a public trial, a procedure sanctioned by a Michigan 
statute. The Court held that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be tried and sentenced 
in a public trial. The opinion of Justice Black for the Court mentioned 
the Sixth Amendment provision that in all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a public trial; but Justice Rutledge, in a 
concurring opinion, stated that he would put the demand of the Sixth 
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment as a restriction upon the 
states.19 A later decision, in 1968, adopted the Rutledge view and inter­
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preted the Black opinion as having absorbed or incorporated the Sixth 
Amendment into the Fourteenth.20
In 1961 there came the turn of the Fourth Amendment guarantee 
against unreasonable searches and seizures to be incorporated into 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Mapp v. Ohio,21 one of the most im­
portant decisions in federal-state relations (and a case that has 
aroused much judicial and academic controversy), the Court held that 
. evidence obtained by searches and seizures that would be a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a state court just as it 
would be inadmissible in a federal court.
In the following year, 1962, in Robinson v. California 22 the Court 
considered a California statute that made it a crime to be a drug ad­
dict. The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional as imposing 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment 
as incorporated into the Fourteenth. Although there has been consid­
erable controversy over whether drug or alcohol addiction is a disease 
or a criminal offense, the Robinson case succeeded in establishing that 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment is 
fully applicable to the states.
As we noted earlier, in the Scottsboro case, in 1932, the Court held 
that in capital cases the states are required to provide counsel to the de­
fendant. In 1963, in the famous Gideon case,23 the Court extended the 
rule to apply to almost all criminal cases. The Court, in an opinion by 
Justice Black, held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a “fundamen­
tal” right; that a provision of the Bill of Rights that is “fundamental and 
essential to a fair trial” is obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment; the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel in 
almost all criminal cases is part of the Due Process clause that is bind­
ing upon the states.
It has been said that Mapp and Gideon were the beginning of the 
Court’s “due process revolution” that has nationalized or constitution­
alized state criminal procedures. Specifically as a result of Gideon, 
cities and states now have public defender lawyers that provide coun­
sel to indigent defendants. A study by the Department of Justice in 
1984 reported that two-thirds of the population are served by public 
defenders. Where such lawyers are not provided, trial court judges ap­
point private attorneys. The far-reaching effect of the Courts decision 
in Gideon can easily be seen.
Next, in 1964, the Court, overruling precedents, held that the states, 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, are bound by the Fifth 
Amendments privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Brennan, for 
the Court, stated that the Fourteenth Amendment “secures against 
state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees 
against federal infringement—the right of a person to remain silent 
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own free 
will, and to suffer no penalty. . .  for such silence.”24
That the Court in this case absorbed the Fifth Amendment guaran­
tee against self-incrimination became clear beyond any question from 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan and Justice Tom Clark, who 
contended that the Due Process clause, standing on its own foundation, 
exacts a standard of justice, whose meaning can be ascertained without 
reference to the Fifth Amendment.
We have seen that the provisions of the Sixth Amendment guaran­
teeing the right of assistance of counsel and the right to a public trial 
in criminal prosecutions were absorbed into the Due Process clause. 
The same amendment also guarantees that in all criminal cases in the 
federal courts the defendant shall have the right to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him. In Pointer v. Texas25 in 1965, the Court 
unanimously held that this provision, too, is an essential part of the 
due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, binding upon 
the states.
Two other provisions of the Sixth Amendment, the right to a 
speedy trial and the right to a trial by jury in criminal prosecutions, 
were in 1967 and 1968 made requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.26
One important guarantee of the Fifth Amendment—“nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb” —still remained to be tested for its possible application to 
state criminal prosecutions. In Benton v. Maryland,27  in 1969, on the 
last day of Chief Justice Warrens sixteen-year service, the Court de­
clared the guarantee applicable to the states.
Are there still guarantees of the Bill of Rights that remain unincor­
porated into the Fourteenth Amendment? The following may be 
listed, although they hardly deserve to be considered fundamental:
(1) the Fifth Amendment provision for indictment by a grand jury in 
cases involving capital or otherwise infamous crime; (2) the Seventh 
Amendment guarantee of trial by jury in civil cases; (3) the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition on excessive bail or fines. Then there are the 
Second Amendment on the right to keep and bear arms, and the 
Third Amendment, which prohibits quartering of soldiers in any 
house in time of peace.
We have taken note only of the entry of guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. Within the compass of this 
essay I cannot consider the many subsequent refinements, 
qualifications, and broad or restrictive interpretations that the Court 
has imposed on each of the guarantees in the many hundreds of cases 
that have been considered by the Court. Cases have been decided and 
then overruled; precedents have received contradictory interpreta­
tions by different justices. Constitutional law is more of a jungle or 
wilderness than a planned garden or park. Despite these facts, it is 
important to know and to remember that the guarantees, in the plain 
language in which they were written in the Bill of Rights as restric­
tions on the federal government, can now be read as equally guaran­
tees that are binding on the states. It is a great tribute to the Supreme 
Court that it has read the few simple words of the Due Process clause 
as containing within themselves all of the essential provisions of the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth amendments. And most of this 
monumental achievement came in the relatively short period of two 
decades, 1947-1969.
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Different Philosophical Approaches
It is no surprise that different justices, each coming to his or her task 
with special ideological baggage, will read the text of a constitutional 
guarantee differently in the context of a set of facts. This is inevitable. 
And especially is this inevitable when one bears in mind the basic prin­
ciple that generated the development that is, for the sake of convenience, 
referred to as the incorporation doctrine. I think that it is important to 
understand this point; it involves both history and philosophy.
In 1937 the Court had before it a case in which the claim was made 
that a Connecticut court had subjected a defendant to double jeopardy. 
If this case, Palko v. Connecticut,28 had involved a federal prosecution, 
the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy would have 
applied, but how could the defendant claim the guarantee in a state 
prosecution? Well, it will be remembered that Justice John Marshall 
Harlan, as long ago as 1884, and again in 1908,29 argued, in dissents, that 
whatever would be an infringement of the Bill of Rights if done in a fed­
eral court, should equally be an infringement if done in a state court. In 
Palko, Justice Cardozo, for the Court, rejected this claim by the defen­
dant.30 Some rights or liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights had, ad­
mittedly, been made applicable to the states, but not because all the 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights are automatically incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Some guarantees were read into the concept of 
due process only because— in Justice Cardozo’s words that have become 
famous—“they represented the very essence of a scheme of ordered lib­
erty . . .  principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of 
our people as to be ranked fundamental.”
Justice Cardozo s formulation became the seminal principle that 
has generated the development that we have been discussing.
Although Justice Cardozo rejected the doctrine of incorporation, the 
justices who have used that doctrine have nonetheless applied it only
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to guarantees of the Bill of Rights that they have considered to be 
“fundamental.” The various positions that individual justices have 
taken can be summarized as follows:
1. Justice Harlan II was the Courts strongest opponent of the doc­
trine of incorporation. He argued that the doctrine was contrary to 
the principle of federalism and placed the states into a straitjacket 
so that it was impossible for them to serve as laboratories for exper­
imenting with different approaches. In place of incorporation, he 
advocated a test that resembled Justice Cardozo’s formulation; 
namely, is the states procedure consistent with the “fundamental 
fairness” guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment? Never mind 
what the Bill of Rights provides as guarantees against the federal 
government; test the state’s action against the guarantee of “funda­
mental fairness.”
2. Justice Black advocated total absorption of the Bill of Rights into 
the Fourteenth Amendment—that the first eight amendments 
should be read as mandates directed at both the federal govern­
ment and the states equally. In this position he was supported by 
Justices Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, and Goldberg.
3. Justice Frankfurter strongly opposed the Black position and advo­
cated what essentially was a case-by-case approach in which the 
“fair trial” test would be used. He would ask, does the state action 
“shock the conscience” ? or is it consistent with “common standards 
of civilized conduct” ? I think that the difference between the 
Frankfurter and the Harlan tests is more in nuance than in
. substance.
4. Selective incorporation. Overriding some fine distinctions, what 
the Court most often accomplished was selective incorporation of 
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, the name by which the process 
is generally and rightly identified.
As illustrative of the different approaches or theories, we can look at 
the four opinions in the Duncan v. Louisiana case.31 The question be­
fore the Court was whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a trial 
by jury in all criminal cases is equally binding upon the states. By a 7-2 
vote the Court decided in the affirmative. In his opinion for the Court, 
Justice Byron White summarized what had been accomplished by 1968 
in placing some provisions of the Bill of Rights under the guarantee of 
the Due Process clause: the right to compensation for property taken 
by a state;32 rights of speech, press, and religion; the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, to be free of compelled self­
incrimination, right to have counsel in criminal prosecutions, right to 
a speedy and public trial, and the right to confront witnesses. In the in­
stant case, the Court held that the Due Process clause guarantees a 
right of jury trial in all state criminal cases that, were they to be tried in 
a federal court, would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee 
of trial by jury. A jury trial in criminal cases, said Justice White, is “fun­
damental to our system of justice__ Our conclusion is that in the
American states, as in the federal judicial system, a general grant of 
jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right.”
Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas joined, contended that 
“the Fourteenth Amendment made all of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights applicable to the States.” He argued strongly against the posi­
tion of Justice Harlan that “due process is an evolving concept” that 
entails a “gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion” —a doc­
trine that leaves judges free to decide at any particular time whether a 
particular rule embodies an “immutable principle of free govern­
ment” or is a principle “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” or 
whether certain conduct “shocks the judge’s conscience.” This ap­
proach, he said, vests unconfined power in the judges, a result that 
contradicts the belief that we have a written constitution in order to 
limit government power. The notion that due process requires only 
“fundamental fairness” makes the concept dependent on a judge’s idea 
of ethics and morals instead of compelling him or her to depend on 
the boundaries fixed by the written words of the Constitution.
Finally, Justice Black rejected the argument that applying the Bill of 
Rights to the states interferes with the concept of federalism and pre­
vents states from trying novel social and economic experiments.
“ I have never believed,” he wrote, “that under the guise of federalism 
the States should be able to experiment with the protections afforded 
our citizens through the Bill of Rights.”
Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Potter 
Stewart joined, contended that those responsible for the Fourteenth 
Amendment never intended that it should be interpreted as incorporat­
ing the first eight amendments. Incorporation puts the states into a 
straitjacket, limiting them and the nation to mid-nineteenth-century 
conceptions of “liberty” and “due process.” The Bill of Rights may be 
looked to for some guidance in interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but the proper process of interpretation starts with an at­
tempt to define “liberty” and “due process” “in a way that accords with 
American traditions and our system of government.” This process en­
tails a “ gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion,’ seeking, 
with due recognition of constitutional tolerance for state experimenta­
tion and disparity, to ascertain those ‘immutable principles . . .  of free 
government which no member of the Union may disregard.’ ”
When in the past the Court had asserted that certain rights were 
guaranteed as limits on state action, the important thing was not that 
these rights had been found in the Bill of Rights, but that “they were 
deemed, in the context of American legal history, to be fundamental.”
To emphasize this point, Justice Harlan turned to the opinion of Justice 
Cardozo in Palko, from which he quoted: “If the Fourteenth Amend­
ment has absorbed them [rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights] the 
process of absorption has had its source in the belief that neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Justice Harlan agreed 
with Justice Cardozo that the test is whether a right is a “principle of jus­
tice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.”33 “ The central proposition of Palko? Justice 
Harlan concluded, “a proposition to which I would adhere, is that‘due 
process of law’ requires only that criminal trials be fundamentally fair.”
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In a relatively brief concurring opinion, Justice Abe Fortas essentially 
agreed with Justice Harlan. The draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, he wrote,
intended what they said, not more or less: that no State shall deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. It is ulti­
mately the duty of this Court to interpret, to ascribe specific meaning to' 
this phrase. There is no reason whatever for us to conclude that, in so
doing, we are bound slavishly to follow. . .  the Sixth Amendment___The
Due Process Clause . . .  does not command us rigidly and arbitrarily to 
impose the exact pattern of federal proceedings upon the 50 States. On the 
contrary,. . .  we should, so far as possible, allow the greatest latitude for 
state differences.34
Emergence of a Third (Unwritten) Bill of Rights
Thus far we have considered the “incorporation” of the first eight 
amendments into the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, with the end result that we now have a Bill of Rights that is 
binding on both the federal government and the states—what I con­
sider the most important constitutional development of the twentieth 
century and especially since the Everson decision in 1947. But the 
story is incomplete without relating the development of another con­
stitutional process, one that transcends the Bill of Rights, what has 
been called the “incorporation plus” 35 doctrine—a process by which 
new rights and liberties, both substantive and procedural, have been 
created and assimilated into the Constitution.
Although this significant development has taken place chiefly since 
1947, it will be helpful to an understanding of the matter if we consider 
two cases that were decided in the 1920s that foreshadowed the need of 
going outside of and beyond the provisions of the Constitution for the
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recognition of rights or liberties that must be considered fundamental 
and indispensable in a free society.
In the first of the two cases, Meyer v. Nebraska,36  the Court had be­
fore it a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of any subject in 
any public or private school in any language other than English. The 
law was adopted in 1919 in the course of World War I. Meyer taught in 
a Lutheran parochial school and used a German translation of the 
Bible in his teaching.
The Court held that the law violated Meyer’s constitutional rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. To reach this conclusion, the 
Court said that it needs to define the “liberty” that the Due Process 
clause guarantees. Without doubt, said the Court, the term “liberty”
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the 
individual to contract [Meyer had a contract with the school], to engage in 
any of the common occupations of life [such as teaching], to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship 
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and, generally, to 
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men The established doctrine is
that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting 
the public interest, [italics supplied]
As can be readily seen, the case did not involve any question of proce­
dure; “due process” was not involved. What was involved was the 
meaning of the word “liberty” in the Due Process clause; the case, 
therefore, is an instance of substantive due process. Moreover, the lan­
guage of the opinion goes beyond the liberty to make a contract to 
teach; it practically illustrates the meaning of the “pursuit of happi­
ness” of which the Declaration of Independence speaks. It speaks of 
liberties that do not, except for the reference to the free exercise of re­
ligion, point to any of the rights or liberties enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights. The opinion “incorporates” into the term “liberty” substantive 
rights that transcend those enumerated in the Constitution.
The second of our two cases, Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the 
Holy Name,37 involved an Oregon statute that prohibited attendance at 
parochial and private schools by children between the ages of eight 
and sixteen years. Such children were required to attend only public 
schools. The Court unanimously held the law unconstitutional; it held 
that under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, the Oregon law unrea­
sonably infringed on the right or liberty of parents to direct the educa­
tion of their children and their upbringing, and that this infringement 
threatened the destruction of the school operated by the Society of 
Sisters, a destruction of their “business” and “property.” Said the Court:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this 
Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its 
children___The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nur­
ture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
This case, too, is an instance of substantive due process—substan­
tive, not procedural; and it, too, placed a content into the term “lib­
erty” that can claim no foundation in any of the specific liberties 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. This case and Meyer have often been 
cited in subsequent cases and have become firmly fixed in American 
constitutional law.
These two cases offered no jurisprudential theory for their radical 
conclusions that, in effect, wrote into the Bill of Rights guarantees of 
new substantive rights, such as
■  the right to engage in any of the common occupations of life;
■  the right to acquire knowledge;
■  the right to marry;
■  the right to establish a home and to bring up one’s children;
■  the right to enjoy privileges recognized at common law as essen­
tial to the orderly pursuit of one’s happiness;
■  the right to teach and the right to study a foreign language;
■  the right to attend a private school.
These are all essential rights or liberties that emanate from the consti­
tutional guarantee of “liberty” as the term is used in the Due Process 
clause.
As we have said, the Pierce and Meyer cases offer no theoretical 
foundation for their far-reaching decisions. The Court waited for over 
four decades to face the theoretical, philosophical underpinnings of 
the proposition that the Constitution guarantees rights or liberties that 
are not enumerated in the Bill of Rights. I refer to the birth control 
case, Griswold v. Connecticut, decided in 1965,38 one of the Court’s 
most important and most controversial decisions.
Connecticut had on its books a statute, seldom enforced, that made 
it a crime for any person, married or single,39 to use any kind of con­
traceptive, or to give information or instruction in its use. The Court, 
by 7-2, held the statute unconstitutional, and set aside the convictions 
of officers of the Planned Parenthood League. The statute, the Court 
held, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, invaded the constitutional 
right of the privacy of married persons. The case generated no less 
than six opinions that brought to the fore the long-standing contro­
versy over the incorporation doctrine and elicited theories that make 
it possible—or impossible—to extract from the concept of “ liberty” 
new substantive rights or liberties that will receive constitutional pro­
tection. The constitutional issues that were argued in Griswold were 
heard again throughout the nation twenty-two years later, in 1987, 
when the Senate debated and rejected the nomination of Robert H. 
Bork for associate justice of the Supreme Court.
Essentially, what the Court was called on to decide was whether or 
not the right of privacy, and the right to use contraceptives, and the 
right to give instruction in their use, maybe added to the list of sub­
stantive rights that have come out of Pierce and Meyer.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Douglas leaned heavily on Pierce 
and Meyer, and concluded, “And so we affirm the principle of the Pierce 
and the Meyer cases.” There are, said Justice Douglas, rights that are 
“peripheral” to the rights expressly enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 
Freedom of speech and press, e.g., includes the right to distribute, the 
right to receive, the right to read, freedom of inquiry, and freedom to
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teach. Without such peripheral rights, the specific rights of speech and 
press would be less secure. So, too, freedom of association is peripheral 
to the First Amendment rights. These examples of rights upheld by 
Supreme Court decisions in the past, said Justice Douglas, suggest that 
“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub­
stance—  Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of asso­
ciation contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one.” 
Justice Douglas referred also to other amendments as contributing 
to the creation of a zone of privacy that the government may not in­
vade. He also referred to the Ninth Amendment, which provides that 
the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be con­
strued to deny or disparage other rights retained by the people, and he 
concluded that the Court in the instant case was dealing with a right 
of privacy “older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political par­
ties, older than our school system.”
Justice Goldberg’s concurring opinion (in which Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Brennan joined), even more than Justice Douglas’s 
opinion for the Court, brought out the theoretical foundations of the 
line of constitutional jurisprudence that the Pierce and Meyer cases 
had projected. Leaving no room for ambiguity, Justice Goldberg 
began his long opinion with the following summary statement:
I agree with the Court that Connecticut’s birth-control law unconstitu­
tionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy, and I join in its opin­
ion and judgment. Although I have not accepted the view that “due 
process” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates all of the 
first eight Amendments, I do agree that the concept of liberty protects 
those personal rights that are fundamental, and is not confined to the 
specific terms of the Bill of Rights.
Justice Goldberg quoted the words of Justice Cardozo that the Due 
Process clause protects those liberties that are “so rooted in the tradi­
2 2  M il t o n  R. K o n v i t z
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” 
and connected this proposition with the conclusion of Meyer that the 
guarantee of liberty includes the right to marry, establish a home, and 
bring up children. Although these liberties are not mentioned in the 
first eight amendments, they do have a constitutional base in the 
Ninth Amendment, which assumes that the list of rights enumerated 
in the first eight amendments is not exhaustive, that there are other 
rights that are retained by the people.
The Ninth Amendment has justly been called “the forgotten amend­
ment.”40 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Douglas mentions the 
Ninth Amendment, but only timidly, as an afterthought. Not so Justice 
Goldberg; his opinion salvages the amendment from the oblivion into 
which it had dropped and gives it a respectability that it eminently de­
serves. The Ninth Amendment protects those rights and liberties that 
meet the tests laid down by Justice Cardozo in Palko. They thus have a 
foundation in the Constitution, although they may not be in the list of 
rights provided by the first eight amendments. Justice Goldberg 
quoted from a dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis41 that, he said, 
“comprehensively summarized the principles underlying the 
Constitution’s guarantees of privacy” :
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable 
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spir­
itual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part 
of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material 
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights 
and the right most valued by civilized men.
This statement by Justice Brandeis, adopted by Justice Goldberg, is a 
clear echo of what the Court had said in Pierce. In effect, it reads into
the Constitution, especially through the Ninth Amendment, the 
Declaration of Independence.
The case gave Justice Harlan an opportunity to restate his position 
regarding the doctrine of incorporation. The incorporation doctrine 
should not be used to restrict the reach of the Due Process clause (as 
was done by the dissent, as we shall see), no more than it should be 
used to impose on the states the requirements of the first eight 
amendments. The Due Process clause should stand, said Justice 
Harlan, on its own bottom and guarantee the values “ implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty” (quoting Palko). He concluded by empha­
sizing, among other things, the need for the “solid recognition of the 
basic values that underlie our society” —again recalling the message of 
Palko and Pierce.
In his concurring opinion, Justice White did not get involved in the 
discussion of the incorporation doctrine but simply held that the 
Connecticut law deprived married couples of “ liberty” without due 
process of law, “as that concept is used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment” ; and he, too, quoted from Pierce and Meyer.
Justices Goldberg and Harlan, in their respective concurring opin­
ions, wrote as debaters and with passion; so did Justice Black in his dis­
senting opinion. Justice Black started his opinion by attacking the 
Connecticut law as being personally offensive, but, he went on quickly 
to add, that this offered no basis for declaring the law offensive to the 
Constitution. As to privacy, he said, “I like my privacy as well as the next 
one,” but unless the government is prohibited from invading it by some 
specific provision of the Constitution, the action of the government is 
within its legal powers. There is nothing in the Constitution that gives 
anyone a right of privacy.
Turning to a consideration of the Meyer and Pierce cases, Justice 
Black said that perhaps he might be able to find some constitutional 
reason for agreeing with the decisions, but he felt compelled to reject, 
in strong terms, the reasoning of the Court in those cases, for the 
opinions reflect the “natural law due process philosophy” that the 
Court has in other cases rejected.
Justice Black likewise attacked the Palko propositions about the 
“traditions and conscience of our people” and the “fundamental prin­
ciples of liberty and justice.” Such formulas, he said, are based on sub­
jective considerations of “natural justice” and are no less dangerous 
when used to enforce what the Court considers personal rights than 
when used about economic rights.
Justice Black argued, too, that Justice Goldberg had misread the pur­
port of the Ninth Amendment. The framers of the Bill of Rights in­
tended by this amendment to reassure the nation that the federal 
government was vested with only limited, expressly stated powers, and 
that all other powers are reserved to the states. Only this interpretation 
is consistent with the underlying philosophy of federalism on which the 
Constitution is based. “And so,” said Justice Black, “I cannot rely on the 
Due Process Clause or the Ninth Amendment or any mysterious and 
uncertain natural law concept as a reason for striking down this 
[Connecticut] state law.”
Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion, also condemned the law as 
“unwise” and even “asinine,” but this did not make it unconstitutional. 
Justice Stewart found no provision of the Bill of Rights to have been vi­
olated, and to rely on the Ninth Amendment is “to turn somersaults 
with history.” He concluded that he could find no “general right of pri­
vacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in 
any case ever before decided by this Court.”
The diversity and clash of opinions in Griswold became nationally 
a pandemonium. Judges, lawyers, professors, politicians, even presi­
dents of the United States argued over “original intent,” “ incorpora­
tion,” “natural law,” “activism” “privacy.” Complex concepts became 
shibboleths, passwords for “liberal” or “conservative,” and the uproar 
has been maintained for the past thirty years. In 1985 Edwin Meese 
III, attorney general in the Reagan administration, in a formal address 
to the American Bar Association, attacked the incorporation doctrine 
as standing on an “intellectually shaky” foundation,42 and declared it 
to be totally without constitutional validity. The crucial concepts be­
came mere political watchwords in the process of selection of 
Supreme Court justices and of some judges in the federal courts.
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The clamor over these concepts and doctrines, especially the right 
of privacy, increased manifold following the Court’s decision in Roe v. 
Wade, 1973.43 Writing for a majority of seven justices, Justice 
Blackmun held that a woman had the constitutional right to an abor­
tion as an aspect of her right of privacy. The Court divided pregnancy 
into three periods or trimesters. In the first trimester, the woman has 
an essentially unrestricted right to have an abortion; during the second 
trimester, states may regulate abortion to protect the woman’s health; 
in the third trimester, however, and only then, may the states, in order 
to protect the potential life of the fetus, impose restrictions on abor­
tion; but, even then, they must permit an abortion to save the woman’s 
life. States, moreover, may not adopt a theory as to when life of a 
human being begins—they may not decide that life begins at concep­
tion, and thus give a fetus the same rights that are enjoyed by an infant.
Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote separate dissent­
ing opinions criticizing the majority for enforcing a right not specified 
in the Constitution.
But first let us note the opinion for the Court. Justice Blackmun 
said that prior decisions of the Court made it clear that “only personal 
rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty’, Palko v. Connecticut, are included in . . .  [the] guaran­
tee of personal privacy.” The cases, he said,
also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to 
marriage; procreation; contraception; family relationships; and child rear­
ing and education.
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state ac­
tion, as we feel it is, or . . .  in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights 
to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether 
or not to terminate her pregnancy.. . .
We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the 
abortion decision.
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Justice White, dissenting, attacked the majority for simply fashion­
ing “a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers,” and said that 
this was done “with scarcely any reason or authority for its action.” 
This was an exercise, he said, of “raw judicial power.”
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that 
the “ liberty” guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment “embraces 
more than the rights found in the Bill of Rights.” But the liberty is not 
. absolute; the guarantee means only that one may not be deprived of it 
without due process of law. What is the test for a deprivation? The law 
involved in the instant case falls into the area of social legislation, and 
the test “traditionally applied in the area of social and economic legis­
lation is whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational re­
lation to a valid state objective.” The Courts “sweeping invalidation of 
any restrictions on abortion during the first trimester is impossible to 
justify under that standard.” The Court should not have applied the 
standard of “a compelling state interest” but that of “a rational relation 
to a valid state interest.” The fact that a majority of states have had re­
strictions on abortion proves that the right to an abortion is not “so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental.” That asserted right was “apparently completely un­
known to the drafters of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” The drafters 
of the amendment “did not intend to have the Fourteenth Amend­
ment withdraw from the States the power to legislate with respect to 
this [abortion] matter.”
Does Original Intent Really Matter?
The chief justice made several important points. First, he conceded 
that the term “liberty” that is in the Due Process clause protects more 
than the liberties enumerated in the first eight amendments. This con­
cession from a leading proponent of a conservative judicial philosophy 
makes conservative justices just as “activist” as are the liberal justices.
Once it is conceded that the meaning of “ liberty” is not exhausted by 
the Bill of Rights, the right of privacy may be just as constitutional and 
fundamental as is freedom of speech or religious liberty.
Justices Murphy and Rutledge were, I think, the first justices of the 
Supreme Court to explicitly state that the Fourteenth Amendment does 
more than incorporate the Bill of Rights as made applicable to the 
states; the term “liberty” may generate rights and liberties that were 
never dreamt of in the philosophy of the founders.44 That was said in 
1947. In 1961, Justice Harlan45 formulated the point with precision:
“ The full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guar­
antees elsewhere provided in the Constitution__ [This liberty] is a ra­
tional continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all 
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,. . .  and 
which also recognizes,.. .that certain interests require particularly care­
ful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.” 
Thus, whether the matter is approached from the standpoint of the 
Ninth Amendment or from that of the fecundity of the term “liberty,” 
there is agreement that there are liberties that are constitutionally pro­
tected even though they are not enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
Chief Justice Rehnquist s second point is that a statute prohibiting 
or stringently limiting the right to an abortion in the first trimester of 
pregnancy is social legislation and not a law infringing on a funda­
mental right or liberty of a woman. Such a law is not to be subjected to 
“strict scrutiny.” It only needs to satisfy the mere rationality test. Well, 
what difference does it make? It makes all the difference in the world, 
for, as Justice Marshall observed, if a statute is subject to strict scrutiny, 
the statute is always, or nearly always, struck down as unconstitutional, 
but when the mere rationality test is applied, “there is little doubt about 
the outcome; the challenged legislation is always upheld.”46 If a 
woman does not have a fundamental right to an abortion (within the 
schedule formulated in Roe v. Wade), all legislation regulating abortion 
is in effect beyond constitutional challenge. To date, no majority of the 
Supreme Court has gone this far, and it is doubtful if a majority of the 
justices will do so in the foreseeable future.
Third, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not intend that a state legislature should 
have no power to limit a woman’s right to procure an abortion. This is 
the argument familiarly known as “original intent.” It is an argument 
that has been used in other contexts, and is not one that, in my opinion, 
carries much weight. Since, however, the argument has been resorted to 
often, let us consider how much reliance it deserves.
For example, in the Everson case, which involved the question 
whether a state violated the Establishment clause of the First 
Amendment (as absorbed by the Fourteenth Amendment) by paying 
the bus fares of students attending a parochial school, both the major­
ity and dissenting opinions resorted to the “original intent” argument, 
and all justices, without exception, agreed that the “original intent” of 
the framers was to prohibit any breach of the wall of separation be­
tween church and state; yet the Court split 5-4 on whether or not pay­
ing the bus fares was in fact a breach in the wall of separation. The 
“original intent” approach did not answer the ultimate issue.
In his famous dissenting opinion in Adamson,47  Justice Black 
argued that the original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the Due Process 
clause. That was in 1947. In 1968, in Duncan v. Louisiana, Justice Harlan 
turned to the argument from history and wrote: “ The overwhelming 
historical evidence marshaled by Professor Fairman48 demonstrates, to 
me conclusively, that the Congressmen and state legislators who wrote, 
debated, and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment did not think they 
were ‘incorporating’ the Bill of Rights.” No words could more strongly 
state the case from the standpoint of original intent, denying the doc­
trine of incorporation. But in the same Duncan case Justice Black (with 
Justice Douglas joining) just as emphatically attacked the historical 
record on which Justice Harlan had relied. “ I have read and studied this 
article [by Charles Fairman] extensively,” wrote Justice Black,
including the historical references, but am compelled to add that in my view 
it has completely failed to refute the inferences and arguments that I sug­
gested in my Adamson dissent. Professor Fairman’s “history” relies very heav­
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ily on what was not said in the state legislatures that passed on the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Instead of relying on this kind of negative pregnant, my legisla­
tive experience [as United States Senator, 1920- 1937] has convinced me that it 
is far wiser to rely on what was said, and most importantly, said by the men 
who actually sponsored the Amendment in Congress.
Here we have two of the most distinguished and most highly re­
spected justices radically disagreeing as to what, indeed, was the “orig­
inal intent.”
As an even more glaring example of the fragile nature of forensic 
history, consider Wallace v. Jaffree,49  decided in 1985. The issue before 
the Court was whether a state may require a moment of silence at the 
beginning of a school day for the purpose of “prayer or meditation.” By 
vote of 6-3, the Court struck down the statute as a violation of the 
Establishment clause of the First Amendment as incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Our focus of attention, however, is on the dis­
senting opinion of Justice Rehnquist, who contended that decisions 
based on Everson were wrong, for the Constitution did not impose a 
“wall of separation” between church and state. After an elaborate analy­
sis of what he considered the original intent of the framers of the First 
Amendment, he concluded that the Establishment clause forbids estab­
lishment of a national church and preference of one sect over another 
but does not mandate neutrality as between religion and “irreligion.” 
Despite the fact that in Everson all nine justices agreed that the First 
Amendment’s Establishment clause reflected the views of Jefferson 
and Madison, Justice Rehnquist contended that this view “is demon­
strably incorrect as a matter of history.” Nor is it important that there 
were many precedents based on Everson, “for stare decisis may bind 
courts as to matters of law, but it cannot bind them as to matters of 
history.” Apparently, Justice Rehnquist was not self-critical when he 
wrote this statement, for if the majority had agreed with his reading of 
history, what would prevent justices, a few years later, from just as
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strongly rejecting his reading of the historical record—for precedents 
“cannot bind them as to matters of history” ?
Justice White, in a two-paragraph dissenting opinion, stated that he 
appreciated Justice Rehnquist’s explication of the history of the 
Religion clauses, and so, he added, “Against that history [of course, as 
explicated by Justice Rehnquist], it would be quite understandable if 
we undertook to reassess our cases dealing with these clauses, partic­
ularly those dealing with the Establishment Clause__ I would sup­
port a basic reconsideration of our precedents.”
“ The true meaning of the Establishment Clause,” said Justice 
Rehnquist, “can only be seen in its history.” But what is its “true” his­
tory? “You are the salt of the earth; but if salt has lost its taste, how can 
its saltness be restored?” 50 Justices have themselves undermined re­
liance on history; who can restore its reliability?
Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court, “Upon this point a 
page of history is worth a volume of logic.” That was in 1921, in a case 
involving the question whether an estate tax is an excise.51 Seventy 
years later, in cases much more complex and much more consequential 
for the nation, one must be quite hesitant about the application and re­
liability of this aphoristic statement. I think that what Justice Rehnquist 
has done in Jaffree has done much to discredit resort to history, to the 
pursuit of determining the “original intent” of the framers—the intent 
of the persons who wrote the articles of the Bill of Rights and of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, of the congressmen who voted for them, of 
the state legislators who debated and voted on them.
In addition, there is the disturbing question whether it is right to 
make the framers the officials who are to say ultimately what the words 
o f  the Constitution mean. Are they the invisible justices of the 
Supreme Court? They wrote the words, they argued over them and 
voted on them, but is it not for us the living to interpret them, to say 
what they mean? The president does not nominate historians to fill
vacancies on the Supreme Court and to pass judgment on “wie es 
eigentlich gewesen” “how it actually happened.” 52
During the early years of the Great Depression, the Supreme Court 
considered a state mortgage moratorium law that extended temporarily 
the period of redemption from foreclosure sales. In a dissenting opinion 
for four justices, it was contended that the historical sources of the con­
stitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts by the states 
conclusively showed that the intention was to prevent states from giving 
relief to debtors in times of hardship. Writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice Hughes sharply rebuffed the historicism of the dissent with a 
memorable phrase:53
It is no answer . . .  to insist that what the provision meant to the vision of
[a century ago] it must mean to the vision of our time It was to guard
against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the 
memorable warning—“We must never forget that it is a constitution that 
we are expounding . . .  a constitution intended to endure for ages.”54
The same line was taken twenty years later in the case of Brown v. 
Board of Education.55 While the case was pending and was being de­
bated by the justices, the evidence shows that there was the strong like­
lihood that even though they were all opposed to racial segregation on 
moral, humanitarian grounds, five of the justices were of the opinion 
that the original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection clause was not to prohibit segregation in public edu­
cation. A member of the majority was Chief Justice Frederick M. 
Vinson. On September 8,1953, he died, just before the case was to be 
reargued. (At the funeral, Justice Frankfurter remarked to a former 
clerk: “ This is the first indication I have ever had that there is a God.” )56 
Frankfurter, though persuaded that the history of the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was against desegregation, agonizingly hoped 
that a judicial basis would be found for a judgment outlawing segrega­
tion. With the appointment of Earl Warren as chief justice, the line-up 
changed, and the new majority was for a desegregation decision.
But there was grave concern that a divided Court decision would 
lack the moral impact that a desegregation decision desperately
needed. A divided Court could mean a divided nation. Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Frankfurter made special efforts to persuade jus­
tices not to dissent, and particularly not to write dissenting or even 
concurring opinions. The great stumbling block was the problem of 
“original intent.” The final draft of the Court’s opinion, written by 
Chief Justice Warren, neatly skirted this issue:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when 
the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson57 
was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full de­
velopment and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.
Thus, by bypassing the historical problem, the opinion satisfied all jus­
tices, and the Court spoke with one voice. This was the achievement, not 
of a specialist in forensic history, but of a judicial statesman.
"The end of the matter; all has been heard" 58
The original Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, applied only to the federal 
government. We can think of it as the First Bill of Rights; in the twenti­
eth century—and especially since 1947—what may be called the 
Second Bill of Rights has been created by decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court, which have “incorporated” or “absorbed” most of the 
guarantees of the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights, namely 
the First, the Fourth, the Fifth, the Sixth, and the Eighth.59 These guar­
antees have been read into the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, ratified in 1868, as applicable to the states. Justice Black, 
sometimes joined by Justice Douglas, maintained that all of the first 
eight amendments had been incorporated into the Due Process clause; 
the Court, however, proceeded only gradually and selectively in the 
process of incorporation.
Justices Murphy and Rutledge from the first held that the Due 
Process clause did more than absorb the Bill of Rights, that the concept 
of “liberty” in that clause made possible the recognition of guarantees 
that were not enumerated in the first eight amendments. One may say 
that this proposition was implicit in two cases decided in 1923 that
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stated that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a person to marry, 
to found a family, to raise and educate his or her children—all substan­
tive rights that are not mentioned anywhere in the Bill of Rights.
This line of reasoning culminated in Griswold, in 1965, when the 
Court held that the Constitution guaranteed individuals the right of 
privacy. In 1973 the Court held that a woman’s right to choose to have 
an abortion is an aspect of her right of privacy.
There are thus unenumerated rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
There is thus, in effect, a Third Bill of Rights, unwritten except for the 
specific fundamental rights that emerge out of decisions of the Court.
We have seen that there have been and are sharp differences of opin­
ion in the Court as to the theories, the jurisprudential and constitu­
tional philosophies on which these momentous developments maybe 
based. The debates over them have been vigorous and are not likely to 
abate in the foreseeable years ahead. But the debate over “original in­
tent,” over whether some constitutional rights are “fundamental” and 
some not, over whether some laws are subject to “strict scrutiny” when 
constitutionally challenged, whether unenumerated rights can be 
justified by the Ninth Amendment, or by the Due Process clause, or on 
Justice Cardozo’s formulation, namely, that asserted rights imposed 
limits on states because “they represented the very essence of a scheme 
of ordered liberty,. . .  principles of justice so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental” (Palko) — 
no voice out of Sinai will be heard to resolve these questions. Cases will 
continue to be decided by a divided Court, and there will be concurrent 
and dissenting opinions. I think, however, that the Constitution will 
continue to contain, not one Bill of Rights, but three.
I cannot, moreover, conclude this discussion without calling atten­
tion to a significant cognate development. Starting in the 1970s, fol­
lowing the swearing-in of Justice Rehnquist on January 7,1972, there 
was pervasive apprehension that a conservative majority in the 
Supreme Court may move in a direction that may undo the gains that
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had been made on behalf of civil liberties and civil rights. To meet this 
situation, highest courts of states began to look at the Bills of Rights of 
the state constitutions in order to avoid the possibility of restrictive 
decisions by the United States Supreme Court under the provisions of 
the United States Constitution.
In a law review article in 1977, Justice Brennan wrote about this 
development:
But the point I want to stress here is that state courts cannot rest when 
they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal 
Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, 
their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has 
brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the protec­
tive force of state law.60
Let me cite a case that will dramatically bring home the force of 
Justice Brennan’s argument. Pursuant to its power to regulate the sale 
of liquor, the state of New York banned topless dancing in establish­
ments operating under a license to serve liquor. When the statute was 
challenged by several restaurants and nightclubs, the New York Court 
of Appeals declared it unconstitutional, for, the court held, topless 
dancing was a form of protected expression under the First 
Amendment. By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court reversed and held 
that the ban did not violate the First Amendment, for the state s power 
to regulate or ban the sale of liquor included the lesser power to ban 
the sale of liquor on premises where there was topless dancing.61
On remand, the case came again before the Court of Appeals, but 
now, for the first time, it considered the case under the free speech 
provision of the state constitution, and held that the ban on topless 
dancing was a violation of the state constitution.62 Thus, as this case 
forcefully illustrates, when the United States Constitution does not
fully provide certain rights, the issues are by no means foreclosed at 
the state level under state constitutions.63
In a law review article in 1986, Justice Brennan wrote: “Rediscovery 
by state supreme courts of the broader protections afforded their own 
citizens by their state constitutions . . .  is probably the most important 
development in constitutional jurisprudence of our times.”64 This is 
probably, I submit, over-generous praise of the development, but that 
the development deserves high praise is beyond reasonable dispute. 
The highest acclaim remains for the Second and Third Bills of Rights, 
and associated with them I would place the Bills of Rights of the state 
constitutions.
What of the future? With Cardinal Newman, I can say, “Lead kindly 
Light,” but not “amid the encircling gloom” ; only an obdurate pes­
simist can despair. At the time of writing this essay, there are only 
three members of the Court who are confirmed, resolute, conservative 
ideologues: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Clarence 
Thomas. If they had the power, they would turn the clock back, and 
although they profess to be nonactivists, they would undo the accom­
plishments of the last fifty years.
Thus far, however, there has been only one major setback, affecting 
the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment,65 and some whit­
tling away at the rights of defendants in criminal cases, and abortion 
rights,66  but the gains by far outweigh the losses. It would be witless, I 
think, to anticipate that a majority of the Court would agree on “any 
extreme of wickedness or folly.” 67
A strong confirmation of this optimistic view came unceremoni­
ously in a case decided in January 1994. The case, Albright v. Oliver,68 
on its facts is scarcely important. The decision, by a 7-2 vote, generated 
no less than six opinions. There was no majority opinion, but the plu­
rality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices 
O’Connor, Scalia, and Ginsburg, and it is this opinion that merits our 
attention, for in it Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia— 
two of the three generally identified conservative members of the 
Court—concedes that the Second and Third Bills of Rights are not 
threatened to be undone.
Briefly, Albright, the petitioner, claimed that the right to be free 
from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause was a substan­
tive due process “ liberty interest” under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process clause. The plurality opinion was that Albright might 
have had a claim under the Fourth Amendment, which he did not al­
lege, but that there was no substantive due process “liberty interest” to 
be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. The 
Court, said the chief justice, is reluctant to expand the concept of sub­
stantive due process because the guideposts are “scarce and open- 
ended,” but he conceded that substantive due process rights have been 
recognized in matters relating to marriage, family procreation, and 
the right to bodily integrity. For this proposition the opinion referred 
to Planned Parenthood v. Casey,69  in which the Court’s opinion re­
ferred to the Pierce, Meyer, and Griswold decisions. Then the chief jus­
tice went on to say that in the last one hundred or more years, the 
Court “has concluded that a number of procedural protections con­
tained in the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment,” and he enumerated the protections: the 
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule; the Fifth Amendment’s privi­
lege against self-incrimination; the Double Jeopardy clause of the 
Fifth Amendment; and the Sixth Amendment’s rights to counsel, to 
speedy trial, to compulsory process, and to trial by jury.
Justice Scalia, as mentioned, joined in this opinion, and in the brief 
concurring opinion that he wrote, he did not challenge the chief jus­
tice’s summary of rights established by the Court that constitute what 
I have denominated the Second Bill of Rights and the Third Bill of 
Rights. These rights as originally defined maybe narrowed or broad­
ened in the years to come, but I think it is safe to say that the core of 
them will remain enshrined as American constitutional law, the twen­
tieth century’s gift to the nation. ■
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